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Harold Bloom is the author of a recent large and widely discussed
book, The Western Canon.\ The author of more than twenty books,
Bloom has been a towering figure, and also a frequent target, on the
landscape of literary studies for many years. The very title of this book
might already suggest something of why his views have been unpopular
in various quarters. By 'The Western Canon' Bloom means in part a
group of authors (Bloom says authors not texts) whose writings have
certain qualities which make them authoritative in our culture. A
prominent view in recent years has been that such a canon is not only
untenable but even offensive. It perpetuates the myth, authoritarian in
character, of universally valid literary values and traditions, against
which everything is to be judged. But this has been held to be a myth
not just about literature. Commitment to such a canon is more broadly
ethically and politically authoritarian, since the literary values enshrined
in the works said to constitute the canon actually serve to reinforce
bourgeois ideals which have supported oppressively hierarchical
features of western culture-most notably patriarchy, sexism, racism,
and class-consciousness.
That is a stronger claim than saying simply that what is wrong with
the idea of a canon is that it expresses a desire to entrench a particular
set of moral and political views. For even if such entrenchment
involves the 'marginalizing' of practices and outlooks and convictions
which oppose the moral and political values in question, those values
might not be as repressive as the stronger claim supposes. But that
distinction does not matter here, since Bloom directly opposes this
whole way of thinking about what invocation of a canon must involve.
The following passage from his book both registers that opposition,
and suggests what he takes to be the most important use (Bloom's
word) of reading those authors who make up his version of the Canon.
I want to see whether what Bloom says here helps us, in the shadow of
postmodernism, to a better way of thinking about a very old question:
in what sense, if any, the importance imaginative literature has for us
involves its moral significance. Bloom writes:
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The silliest way to defend the Western canon is to insist that it
incarnates all of the seven deadly moral virtues that make up our
supposed range of normative values and democratic principles. This is
palpably untrue. The Iliad teaches the surpassing glory of armed
victory, while Dante rejoices in the eternal torments he visits upon his
very personal enemies. Tolstoy's private version ofChristianity throws
aside nearly everything that anyone among us retains, and Dostoevsky
preaches anti-Semitism, obscurantism, and the necessity of human
bondage. Shakespeare's politics, insofar as we can pin them down, do
not appear to be very different from those of his Coriolanus, and
Milton's ideas of free speech and free press do not preclude the
imposition of all manner of societal restraints. Spenser rejoices in the
massacre ofIrish rebels, while the egomania of Wordsworth exalts his
own poetic mind over any other source of splendor.
The West's greatest writers are subversive of all values, both ours
and their own. Scholars who urge us to find the source of our morality
and our politics in Plato, or in Isaiah, are out of touch with the social
reality in which we live. If we read the Western canon in order to form
our social, political, or personal moral values, I firmly believe we will
become monsters of selfishness and exploitation. To read in the
service of any ideology is not, in my judgment, to read at all. The
reception of aesthetic power enables us to learn how to talk to ourselves
and how to endure ourselves. The true use of Shakespeare or of
Cervantes, of Homer or of Dante, of Chaucer or of Rabelais, is to
augment one's own growing inner self. Reading deeply in the Canon
will not make one a better or a worse person, a more useful or more
harmful citizen. The mind's dialogue with itself is not primarily a
social reality. All that the Western Canon can bring is the proper use of
one's own solitude, that solitude whose final form is one's confrontation
with one's own mortality. (pp.29-30)
There is considerable deployment of rhetoric here, and I do not think
that Bloom really believes that one who read the western canon to form
his or her personal values-if we can even make sense of the project-
would have to become a monster of selfishness and exploitation. But
still, Bloom trenchantly dissociates what he calls the 'aesthetic power'
of the writers whose canonical standing he wants to display from any
particular moral views which their works may enjoin, and emphasises
that the true 'use' of reading in the canon is the reception of such
aesthetic power.
I want to develop my theme by trying to bring out more of what
Bloom imagines the 'canonical' standing of the authors he reflects on,
to involve. Consider the terms in which Bloom speaks about how we
are engaged-we could say the 'level' at which we are most deeply
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engaged-by the writing he proposes to reflect on. Our reading there
involves what he calls the 'mind's dialogue with itself. This is not, he
says, primarily a social reality. In such reading, we find that 'our own
growing inner self is augmented'. With these tenns, Bloom ushers in
the sense of a dimension of inwardness, in what we are, which cannot
be wholly understood on the plane of social reality, the plane on which
we are 'more useful and more hannful citizens'. His thought is that it
is this 'dimension' of what we are which is most importantly engaged,
and capable of being 'augmented'-in and through the agon (his
word), the struggle, involved in that reading of the literature which
belongs to the canon. It is important to get things the right way round
here: works, or writers, belong to the canon because they engage us in
this continually 'agonistic' way, because they thus make these demands
on us, take us out of ourselves in responding to them. This is close to
the reverse of saying that authors get into the canon because they
endorse a set of already wholly detenninate social, political and moral
values whose dimensions and effects are already fully known to us.
Canonical status, for Bloom, is not election into a mausoleum-a
repository of the bones of dead white males in a now familiar phrase-
but a mark of an ever renewed power to renew, to transfonn, to vivify,
to deepen the lives and self-understanding of those capable of reading.
Before continuing, I need to mark a misleading accent in Bloom's
passage. To reading in the canon in order to fonn our social and moral
values Bloom misleadingly opposes reading in it to foster the proper
use of our own solitude. Or rather, that opposition will be misleading if
'one's own solitude' is proposed as the only conceptual counter to a
picture of human beings as 'social' creatures. The dimension of
inwardness which I said Bloom is trying to uncover will not be realised
or manifested only in 'the proper use of one's solitude'. It will also
show itself in differences in the ways in which human beings are able
to engage with and 'understand' one another. The 'augmenting of the
inner self Bloom speaks of is not tied only to contexts of individual
solitude and privacy (as Bloom's words here may tempt one to sUppose).2
So, at least, the line of thought I develop will suggest.
Something Bloom cites from the eighteenth-century Italian thinker
Giambattista Vico can help us appreciate what Bloom is getting at in
the passage I quoted from him. Vico thought that three phases could
be identified in the development of Western culture: a Theocratic, an
Aristocratic and a Democratic phase-the age of gods, of heroes, and
of men. A sense of the world as divinely ordained and ordered, indeed
divinely saturated, is superseded by a world dominated by semi-divine
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kings and lawgivers, which eventually makes way for the democratic
age. This last age is not defined by the predominance in the world of a
certain fonn of government. That is itself an expression, or effect, of a
wider and more fundamental shift in sensibility-a sense ofhierarchies
as having been levelled. (Opposition to the very idea of the literary
canon as implying a 'hierarchy' of literary worth, is thus itself another
expression of the democratic impulse Vico foreshadows.) Without
wanting Vico's picture to bear too much significance, I think it is
suggestive in relation to the passage I quoted from The Western Canon.
In the two phases which Vico identifies as preceding the democratic,
there is arguably no difficulty in sustaining a sense that there is a
dimension of significance to human life which is not merely 'social',
and even the sense that what is of most significance escapes being
understood in social tenns. If that is evidently so in the case of the
'theocratic' phase of culture, with its conviction of the world as
devolving from the divine, it is hardly less so for the aristocratic age,
since as I said the significance of its hierarchies is an echo of a still
pervasive sense ofdivine hierarchy. But it can readily seem that things
are very different indeed, come the democratic age. Then the significance
of our ex.perience is radically reduced. There is no longer any room for
significances which escape being wholly understood in tenns of the
kind Bloom calls social, where these can include political, sociological,
psychological, psychoanalytic, and biological tenns. The gaze of a
modem sceptical and levelling eye has simply dissolved the illusory
reality of all those earlier ways of making sense of our experience. (It
matters not here whether we name that gaze 'Enlightenment reason'
or 'suspicion'.) Of course a certain kind of 'inwardness' can be
acknowledged in such a world: but it is essentially accessible to some
science or other, some 'systematic' 'theoretical' discourse, be it
psychology, or psychoanalysis, or economics, or Marx.ism, or
deconstructionism or something else. There is no longer available or
accessible a sense or dimension of inwardness-a beyond-the-ready-
to-hand inwardness having a significance which might be called
spiritual-{)f the kind which was sustainable by the theocratic and
aristocratic phases of our cultural history. Then, entrenched in the
'democratic' age, we necessarily live in a world of fewer dimensions
and lesser depth, a world in which, as Nietzsche put it, God is dead,
however much a fair number of individuals may still invoke his name.
So it may seem, and so-a thought I'll elaborate later-some
versions of post-modernism, unfortunately the most popular ones,
maintain. But that-I suggest-is not how Bloom sees things, and
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neither do I. It is not that Bloom denies Vico's distinctions. But,
acknowledging them, he wants to insist on the continuing need for
recognition of a dimension of 'inwardness', a 'reality' of each and all
of us which is 'not social', and to insist, furthermore, that a seminal
way in which this 'inner self can be engaged and deepened, augmented,
is precisely through encounter with what he calls 'the Canon'. Bloom's
thought is that an understanding of what we are which lacks, or denies
to us, a certain kind of inwardness, or which fails to appreciate the need
for the continual nourishment and 'augmenting' of such inwardness,
seriously impoverishes us. But as this implies, Bloom resists the
widespread suggestion, more often assumption, that the sense of there
being a crucial not-primarily-social'dimension' of what we are depends
upon convictions about 'the gods'-and more broadly about trans-
human hierarchies and principles ofdivine orcosmic order--convictions
which are culturally no longer available to us. He thinks that literature
remains capable of fostering the 'increase' of such inwardness, capable
of deepening our sense of what it is to be human, even in the age Vico
calls democratic. Bloom does not deny that the pressure of the age is
both against acknowledgment of such a dimension of 'inwardness' as
crucial to what we are, and also therefore against acknowledgment of
literature as capable of the power he writes of. But in Bloom's view, I
think, this actually gives literature a culturally more, not less, important
place than before.
Well, I have been speaking, very generally, about a 'particular
kind' of inwardness, and I need to make clear what I mean. Let me
refer, briefly, to Andrew Riemer's book on the Demidenko debate.3
One of Riemer's many themes in the book is whether The Hand that
Signed the Paper itself endorses the wicked actions, and beliefs,
which it ascribes to various of its characters, or whether, at least from
time to time and partly, it condemns those. Riemer, partly sharing a
contemporary suspicion of any such thing as 'authorial' voice, avoids
pressing the question in quite those terms. Instead he claims that there
are many 'voices' in Darville's novel, and that their juxtaposition,
often ironic though he says not always very successfully so, warrants
saying that the 'unspeakable evil'-his phrase-which the book
records cannot be regarded as assented to or endorsed by the book or its
author. But even if we grant the subtlety about 'authorial voice', this
way of discussing the book-'is it to be blamed or exculpatedT-
misses something very important. What matters is not whether those
characters in the book who perpetrate deeds of what Riemer calls
'unspeakable brutality' are or are not 'condemned' either by other
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characters in the novel or by an 'authorial voice', or whether they are
'counterpointed' by other voices. What matters is rather the possibility
of rendering what is shown-of what those characters do and how they
think-in such a way that a deeper understanding of it is made
accessible. I do not mean that the characters who do the deeds have to
be shown as understanding what they do, nor even necessarily that any
other character in the book must be shown as understanding this. But a
way of realising to us readers, the significance, the meaning-by
contrast with the psychological and social causes-of what has been
thus done has to be found, if the book is to have any chance ofcounting
as exploring what it presents, indeed if it is to have any chance of being
seriously engaged with the events it depicts.4
Let me try to make clear what I mean here by moving away from
literature specifically. In the modem world of unprecedented sexual
licence, sexual crimes are regarded as more serious than ever before.
That conjunction already marks something close to a paradox, the
telling of which would be deeply revealing of the times. But I want to
consider something perhaps at a tangent to, or at least not immediately
connected with, that paradox: a kind of discussion one encounters
frequently, inside and outside philosophy, of the kind of evil involved
in rape. A central concept in it is that of autonomy, and its denial: the
evil of rape consists fundamentally in the denial of another's, usually a
woman's, autonomy. That is held to be the reflective characterisation
which gives the morally significant sense or meaning of someone's
being raped. Talk of denial of autonomy can partner, or lead into, talk
of rape in terms of power-a man's assertion of his power over another
(usually a woman). Now I should not deny that power and denial of
autonomy may both be relevant concepts here, but to highlight them, or
at least to do so without seeing that something different and distinctive
has to be made of them here, risks trivialising the significance of rape.
Rape is made to sound akin to the secretary, in order to annoy the boss,
sending in to see him someone he had expressly said he did not want to
see. His autonomy-here his power of deciding whom he will see-is
denied in that case too. Perhaps she is also trying to assert some power
over him, and he may recognise this. But any comparison with rape is
patently absurd. (If we reversed the example, and had the boss doing
something similar to the secretary, and we still make the secretary
female and the boss male, in order to preserve the power inequalities
which many say that the act of rape seeks to emphasise and enforce,
even then the basic absurdity of comparing such a deed with rape
would not be diminished.) Talk of denial of autonomy and enforcing
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of power inequalities leaves us a long way short of the terribleness of
rape. We need a much richer language than any of this to articulate a
sense of the significance, the meaning, of rape. Just what language is
a further question. All I would say here is that it must be a language
which also reveals the significance of sexual love, since much of the
significance of rape as a serious evil must surely lie in its violation of
the peculiar intense tenderness and intimacy which can infonn and be
infonned by sexual love. The way we make sense of rape reflects, but
also partly shapes, our sense of the possibilities inherent in sexual love.
There is some space here between the way in which someone might
inchoately 'feel' or 'experience' rape, and the way in which they are
able to articulate the significance ofwhat they experience. And doubtless
there are also limits to the experience's expressibility, which could be
registered in someone's saying 'You couldn't know what it is like
unless it has happened to you'. But still, I should say that the fact of
such a gap should not be taken to deny the close connection between
the character of the experience and the kind of language available for
making sense of it. Put it this way. If people came to experience their
being raped, in a way whose significance was adequately given by talk
about denial of autonomy and power of the kind I began with, then rape
could then no longer be registered as having the kind of seriousness it
still has. It could then no longer be registered as the kind of evil which
it still is registered as. Then, I should say, a 'dimension' of our
experience, and of the sense of what we are which is mediated through
that experience, would have atrophied. For that understanding of rape
to come to have sway would involve a dwindling in our sense of the
possibilities which can be realised in part through sexual love. (A
beautiful reflection on the interdependence of our experience of love
and the language available for its articulation, which bears on what I
am saying here, is 'Love and Language' by the poet Fay Zwicky, in
her collection of essays The Lyre in the Pawnshop.)
Now you do not have to agree with everything I have just been
saying in order to appreciate the possibility of a shallower and a deeper
understanding of rape-a shallower and deeper understanding of its
significance or meaning. And we can bring this to bear on what I was
saying in connection with Riemer's book. Of two people who both
condemn rape, one might have only a shallow and the other a deeper
understanding of the significance of what he or she condemns. One
might of course say that from the point of view of being what Bloom
calls a 'useful rather than a harmful citizen', the crucial thing is not
your depth of understanding, but that you do indeed condemn, and
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avoid, rape. And there would be point in saying that. Those of course
very important 'moral requirements' of being a good citizen pertain to
what Bloom calls 'social reality'. But once we move into the possibility
of realising a deeper understanding of (say) rape-sticking with that
for the moment-we move into a territory which escapes containment
within the bounds of such social reality even if it will have significant
effects in that domain. For what is at issue is in part an understanding
ofone's 'inner self ,to use Bloom's phrase, which is always capable of
being 'augmented'-his phrase again-orofdiminishing. The different
understandings of rape involve different realisations of what one is.
The shallower understanding diminishes, rather than 'augments',
one's inner self.
Here, on Bloom's view, we find what he calls the 'true use' of
literature: that it can sustain, and deepen, our inwardness. To demand
of a book-as many did of Darville's book-that it condemn the
deeds it depicted, and to think of its doing or failing to do that as
marking its most significant moral dimensions, is to seek to contain the
significance and power of literature within the domain of what Bloom
calls 'social reality' alone. (As I have already intimated, by the way, I
do not think that we should pooh-pooh the importance of literature's
effects in that domain. As I said, if in that I diverge from what Bloom
actually says, I suspect that this owes only to his striving for rhetorical
effect. Literature-stories-always have, and in some fonn or another
always will, influence people's behaviour in 'social reality', provide
them with models which they will emulate, and which will lead them to
'endorse' some things and 'condemn' others. To say that literature's
value goes importantly beyond that in the Bloomian way I am suggesting
is not to deny it such socially important 'uses'.) There remains the
question, in relation to that demand which many made of Darville's
book, of what understanding would be expressed in any such
'condemnation' of the deeds and lives it depicts. Is the book such that
its exploration of what it presents does enable the 'augmenting' Bloom
speaks of? That is a quite different sort ofquestion from the question of
whether the book condemns or does not condemn the evil it purports
to depict. And Bloom's thought (I am suggesting) is that it is a much
more important question to ask.
I spoke earlier of a widespread assumption that in the 'democratic'
age our lives necessarily lack a kind of depth, inwardness, resonance,
significance which in earlier ages people could readily, because of
their religious convictions, take them to have. A frequent corollary of
that assumption is that this difference of the democratic-in Vico's
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broad sense-present from the past manifests our freedom from a
range of illusions which pervaded our ancestors' lives. This is no myth
or straw figure of my devising. Reference to Riemer's book is again
instructive. He writes:
There can be little doubt that The Hand that Signed the Paper does
attempt to humanize its chief characters, if by that we understand an
endeavour to account for their behaviour in psychological, social,
political and historical terms. (p.84)
The whole tenor of Riemer's discussion makes it clear that this is the
only thing we can mean by 'humanize'. 'Humanizing' the characters
means, that is: locating them in certain indefinitely extensive patterns
of force, or 'cause'-psychological, social, political and historical
causes. Implicitly excluded by the project of humanising, understood
in this way, is the possibility ofattempting to intensify an understanding
of the characters' activity. Let me dwell for a moment on the difference
between a project of extensive understanding and what I am calling
intensive understanding. What Riemer labels 'humanizing' the
characters belongs to the former project: 'understanding' what they
do by locating it in an indefinitely broadenable psychological, social,
historical and political context. By contrast with that, it is possible to
try to reveal what would need to be understood by someone who did
such deeds if he or she were to understand the significance of what
they did. This project would imply a different sense of what it is to
'humanize'. Then one's sense of the depth of a person's humanity
would be shown by the depth or shallowness of the ways in which
sense, of this intensifying kind, is to be made of what they did. So-to
stick with my example-I should say that a novel in which rape was
made sense of only in the first of the ways I spoke of would have failed
to 'humanize' either those presented as its victims or those presented as
its perpetrators, however extensive its locating of what it presents in a
psychological and social context. Riemer claims to think that such
intensifying understanding was once possible but is so no longer. His
thought seems to be that the word 'humanize' can have only the
'extensive' sense unless we import specifically religious, or otherwise
metaphysical, categories into the way we 'make sense' of what people
do. So he writes:
The complaint that the novel perpetrates an outrage by humanizing its
characters only yields sense if it is taken to refer ... to their actions
viewed against a moral, historical, but most significantly a religious or
spiritual background. (p.85)
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And shortly after that:
A ... confusion seems to have informed the complaints about the
impropriety of humanizing or explaining the character's actions and
motivations in the novel. Though the human agents of the operation of
evil may be driven by plausible desires, fears and hatreds, the
consequences of their actions cannot be viewed in purely human, that
is to say secular, terms.... (The tenor of these complaints) is essentially
religious and theological; their cadences are often those of the pulpit or
the revival meeting. Yet none is able to attain that essentially religious
dimension because all, like the novel itself, are firmly trapped within
late-twentieth century secular rationalism ... (p.88)
I do not say that it is improper to invoke psychological, social and
political 'explanations' of the sort Riemer says the novel invokes. Let
us grant the in-principle 'propriety' of that undertaking. Riemer assumes,
however, that any other kind of understanding of what the characters in
Darville's novel are depicted as doing requires both the intelligibility
and the authority of a 'religious' background which has simply passed
from our culture. But now I hope that my discussion about the kind of
evil involved in rape shows this assumption to be simply false. Suppose
a rapist to be 'humanized' in the way Riemer envisages. There still
remains the question of the kind of understanding available of the
significance of what he did. There is no 'essentially religious'
background to the second of the two ways of 'making sense' of the evil
of rape that I spoke about-that is, as a terrible violation of another of
a kind which can be understood only against the background of the
distinctive tenderness and disturbing and vulnerable intimacy which
can inform and be informed by sexual love. I am not certain that those
are exactly the right terms, but they are terms of the right kind. And the
point is that they need no religious 'underpinning'. There need be no
religious background to the thought that only some such way of
making sense of rape has any chance of realising a full understanding
of what the rapist did in raping and the victim suffered in being raped.
There is still good reason to call that an understanding in purely human
terms. It is an understanding of ourselves as creatures of a kind such
that a progressive deepening of a sense of the significance of what we
do is possible for us. But then what our 'humanity' is, in this sense, and
what it is for literary characters to be 'humanized' in this sense,
involves the 'augmenting' of just that dimension of inwardness which
Bloom speaks of. For finding ourselves making sense of rape in that
way just is an aspect of our realising contours and depths in our
experience which is the 'augmenting' of our human inwardness. And
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the possibility of this does not, as Riemer like so many others
supposes. depend at all on a specifically religious or otherwise
metaphysical background which has disappeared from the modem
world.
I have been speaking in a number of ways to the passage from
Bloom with which I began. Does what I have said amount to
according a moral significance to imaginative literature? Well, we
saw Bloom's implicit reason for not speaking that way-in effect
that 'morality' is a word which most readily pertains to the 'mores',
the social customs and practices, of a group; and he thinks that
literature's deepest power is engaged behind or before all that. But
the word can also be used as almost synonymous with 'human'. Then
our deepest moral self-understanding is just ourdeepest understanding
of what we are as human beings; and if that involves the kind of
inwardness which Bloom speaks of. then whatever 'augments' that
can be regarded as morally important. I should like to use the word
'moral' that way, but given the manifold echoes of authoritarianism
and priggishness-echoes of the moralistic-which the word now
evokes, I can appreciate the reason for eschewing it. In any case,
what I have been saying about inwardness and depth can stand
without it.
The phrase 'the indi vidual' was part of my title, and I want to say
a bit more about what it was doing there. To do that I have to say a bit
about post-modernism. A different historical perspective from Vico's,
though one stilI compatible with his, sees post-modernism as a
response to the 'modernism'of the Enlightenment of the second half
of the eighteenth century. The recent French philosopher, Michel
Foucault, observed that while only those who came later could give
their right names to the Renaissance and the Refonnation and
the Dark Ages and Neo-Classicism and so on, the Enlightenment
was unique in naming itself. That fact reflects its very essence:
the conviction that reason could be brought to bear on all human
affairs in such a way that human beings could ideally become wholly
transparent to themselves. The Enlightenment's being able to
name itself, instead of having to wait for a later age to see what its
preoccupations really meant, is a momentary crystallising of that
aspiration to transparent self-understanding. The story is a complex
one, but one outcome of the aspiration can be expressed this way:
to subject all human activity to the gaze of reason, when reason is
understood this way, involves no longer simply accepting that activity
'at face value'. Apparent generosity to a beggar, for example, might
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on Marxist thought in fact be someone's really giving expression to
their class interests, by helping disguise the injustice which the
dominance of his class helps perpetuate. Then no activity, or practice,
or set of values, is just what it seems. The modern practice of unmasking,
integral to the contemporary cultural landscape-seeing the class
interest behind the apparent generosity, the Freudian unconscious
drive behind the conscious representation, the will to power beneath
the religious affirmation, the sexism beneath the family structure-
finds its warrant in this Enlightenment orientation. But an effect of
this orientation is that no practice can any longer be thought of as
having any genuine authority, since all are now truly seen as just
more 'phenomena', all having a particular complex history---of a
psychological, social, political, historical and perhaps biological
kind-which is quite different from the 'justifying' myths with which
those whose practice it is seek to entrench it. (There is no genuine
authority, there is only 'power'.) Once you get into the swing of it, you
can come to the view that ideas of truth, understanding, reality, and
justice are themselves the mere 'effects' of the operation of such
'forces'. So they can no longer be relied on, invoked as evaluative
norms, by a 'discourse' which remains impressed by the aim of
transparent self-understanding. Even the 'individual' is another such
'effect'. Each different individual-you and I-becomes only a set of
'effects' of the operation of various intersecting forces---of political,
social, historical, and biological forces. (One expression of this is the
now familiar idea, already referred to, that there can be no 'authorial'
voice, because the word 'author' is already only the name for a certain
congeries ofeffects. A novel, then, becomes the site for the 'operation'
of indefinitely many effects, which we can if we like call 'voices'.)
This postmodernist conception thus shares the outlook I sketched
before: that a sense of the domain of the human as a domain of
meanings which can be explored ever more deeply is tied to the
illusions of a bygone age. In this way the aspirations of 'modernism'
are disassembled from within by one main strand of postmodernist
thought.
But one does not have to respond to Enlightenment modernism this
way, and it is important to note that there is another, quite different,
strand of post-modernist response.5 This second form ofpost-modernism
does not abandon truth, universality of understanding, reality, justice,
the individual and the meaning of his or her experience, or even
necessarily God. Rather, it seeks to rethink them, to make sense of
them in a different way, a way which I should say goes back behind
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what is sometimes called the 'Enlightenment project' rather than
following out what are taken to be its consequences. In all of this-
the Enlightenment and responses to it-the German philosopher,
Immanuel Kant, who died in 1804, is an ambiguous figure. But one
theme of his late thought bears on what is at issue here. In his book on
aesthetics, the Critique ofJudgment, Kant defined an 'aesthetic idea'
as 'that representation of the imagination which induces much
thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever,
Le. concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently,
can never quite get on level terms with or render completely intelligible'
(pp.175-176). Kant confined what he said to the domain of aesthetics,
but I think we can see it as having a wider scope. In my brief remarks
about rape I said that a language which aspired to making sense of rape
as a serious evil could articulate the violation it effects only against the
background of the distinctively volatile tenderness and intimacy
realisable in sexual love. (Someone could say-many influenced by
post-modernism of the first kind have in effect said-that all such talk
of the tenderness and intimacy realisable through sexual love is just an
insubstantial ideological 'effect' of various social and cultural causes.
In other words it is mere romantic rhetoric. My only remark about that
here is to repeat that if you think that you make it very difficult to see
how rape can be thought of as any more serious than the relatively
trivial offence I contrasted it with earlier.) I think the idea of 'violation'
I there spoke of is like what Kant called an aesthetic idea. That is to say,
it is not as if we already have a full and clear 'understanding' of what
violation is, and then we just apply it to the 'action' of rape. It is rather
that its 'sense' for us remains to be given through what we can make of
it in this particular context. It will acquire resonance and depth which
it wholly lacks when we speak, for example, of traffic violations, or
even of violation of someone's right to choose for him or herself.
It is important that it is not the word in itself, but the word in a
particular way of using it-or better, in a particular way of finding or
'resolving' oneself through one's use of it-which is expressive of
what Kant called an aesthetic idea. It is not, for instance, that the
word 'autonomy' is in itself different from 'violation' in this regard.
As employed in the way of thinking and speaking about rape which I
mentioned, it functions as something more fixed than an 'aesthetic
idea'. The thought there was: 'we know what autonomy is-it is being
free to do what you choose-and rape denies that.' But we can readily
imagine-and many political thinkers, moralists, psychoanalysts, and
even New Age gurus are busy at work-feeling the way towards an
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ever deepened sense of what autonomy might mean. Not any 'being
free to do what you choose' manifests autonomy because sometimes
your choices might be self-destructive, or express radical self-deception.
And so on. So even the idea of autonomy can lend itself to such
progressive deepening without limit-without our ever being finally
able conceptually to 'get on level tenns with it and render it completely
intelligible'. Kant is noting, then, a kind of thinking-which he says is
operative only in aesthetic judgment, but which I am suggesting has a
much wider scope-which essentially involves one's trying, through
an always deepenable attentiveness to the particular occasion which
summons the thinking, to 'get on level tenns with' something which
can never be finally grasped, which can never be wholly laid bare in
concepts. One thing this means is that such thinking can always be
intensified, or deepened, without limit. One can always press towards
further ways in which the experience and the language-which need
each other but which can never become perfectly congruent----<::an
interpenetrate and illuminate one another. But it is crucial to the kind of
thinking Kant is here picturing that it neither ideally issues in, nor is
merely preparing the way for, a transparent self-understanding.
This Kantian line of thought is post-modernist, I suggest, in that it
recognises the impossibility of a final transparently rational self-
understanding. But this recognition occurs not in the spirit either of
dismay or glee, or of complacent bravado presenting itself as facing
honestly up to the sceptically diminished possibilities of the present
age-tones which frequently belong to the first kind of postmodernist
response. What those various tones indicate is the thought that the
only kind of real self-understanding would indeed be such a final
transparently rational one, and since that cannot be had we are
condemned to scepticism about truth, understanding, the individual,
justice, etc. This is another version of the familiar thought: 'After the
death of God there can be no certainty' . But the most interesting aspect
of this thought is the superficiality of its own manner of rejecting.
It does not overcome, but simply leaves unquestioned, the way of
thinking about truth, understanding, the individual, morality and God
which is expressed in the aspiration to a final transparently rational
self-understanding. From the conviction that this way of thinking them
will not 'deliver', it concludes that truth, understanding, the individual
etc. reduce to the status of mere 'effects' of the operation of indefinitely
many 'forces' ----<::ultural, historical, biological, economic and other
forces. But one does not have to conclude this. Indeed it is arguably
incoherent to do so. For if those earlier ways of thinking of truth and so
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on really are in themselves incoherent, then we have lost nothing in
losing them that ever could have realised for us a true understanding of
ourselves. No real possibilities have been taken from us by (let us now
call it) the death of God.
In the face of that thought, postmodernism can take a different
fonn. It can involve recognising the need to think differently about
truth, understanding, the individual, freedom, autonomy, morality,
even God-the need to think them as not essentially constituted in a
way in which the first kind of postmodernism colludes with one
tradition of the Enlightenment in thinking them, and therefore as
having to be abandoned when that way of thinking them proves
inadequate. In the territory of recognition of such a need I locate the
aspect of Kant's philosophy which I have been sketching. The thought
I take from Kant is that the need to 'make sense' of ourselves through
the presentation of what he calls 'aesthetic ideas' marks out a distincti ve
character that our understanding of ourselves as human beings actually
has. That is what real understanding is like.
There are two implications of what I thus take from Kant which I
want to develop a little. In the last of his Four Quartets, ruminating on
the poet's task, T. S. Eliot writes that 'our concern was speech, and
speech impelled us I To purify the dialect of the tribe'. 'Purify' is an
interesting word there, but it is the final phrase I focus on. 'Dialect of
the tribe' is just right. As language users we are indeed a 'tribe', people
with a historically situated and complexly shaped human fonn of life.
It is not just an accident, a mere contingency, that we do not speak
Esperanto, or some other 'language' yet closer to the voice of abstractly
perfect reason, by our subjection to which alone it might be thought
that we would discover what we truly are. But that this is so does
not mean that we should stop speaking, or thinking, about 'what we
truly are'. The point, and Eliot's thought, is that what we truly are is
creatures whose speech must be that of a 'tribe'. 'What we truly are'
can be revealed to us only through speech which is shaped by the
concretely human fonn of life which we live. Only the full use of the
resources of such speech has any chance of realising the significance
and meaning of human experience, through realising which we discover
who and what we truly are. To stick to my example, we will not get
anywhere towards understanding, making sense of, the significance of
rape as a serious crime if we try to resort to Esperanto; or if we attempt
to strip our own language of all nuance, all affectivity, all resonance,
all depth. Doing that could only impoverish our sense ofthe significance
of rape as a serious crime. The implication of Eliot's words, as of what
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Kant says, is that the fully alive and imaginative use of such 'tribal'
speech is a condition of our humanly understanding what we humanly
are. That is not a merely temporary 'resting place' on the way to a
transparent self-understanding which would, ideally, take us beyond
what is expressible only by means of the resources of such 'tribal'
speech. The alive and imaginative use of such speech is an eliminable
condition of our humanly understanding ourselves. And again I
emphasise the word 'humanly' here. It should be clear that nothing in
this way of thinking depends, as Riemer and the first kind of post-
modernism suppose, on specifically religious-or on otherwise
metaphysical-<:onvictions which may no longer be available to us.
I have reflected on Eliot's use of the word 'tribe', but not yet on
'dialect'. Note that he does not say language ofthe tribe. A dialect is a
variation on a language, a variation which reflects local conditions and
differences. This does not mean that the language of which various
dialects are indeed dialects must be identifiable independently of all
the dialects. Even so it allows the thought of a commonness here, a
something shared between the dialects. Likewise, I think Eliot is
evoking the thought of universal human experience, while resisting the
suggestion that it can be identified independently of all 'tribal'
realisations of it. If there is universal meaning in human experience, it
has to be realised through the deployment of the resources of an
absolutely particular, culturally shaped language. (Thus one might
aspire to realising the significance of rape, even while acknowledging
differences of 'dialect' even here.) This is the mode in which alone
universality of experience is possible here. And this is different from
(say) physics, which arguably does aspire to some sort ofmathematical
equivalent of Esperanto.
I spoke of two implications of the kind of thinking which Kant calls
'presenting aesthetic ideas'. The second is that it requires not just the
deployment of a richly culturally saturated language, but also the
capacity of an individual to be able to rise to speaking it with an
individual voice. There is all the difference in the world between
someone echoing the nostrums of the day, and transfonning them into
individually authoritative utterance. Literary works which belong to
what Bloom calIs the Canon are those whose individuality of voice is
so strong as to require an effort on our part as readers to hear and
respond, in doing which we make something new and different of
ourselves. In this is our individuality deepened-'augmented' to use
his word again. Individuality so understood is very different from what
it comes to on the first strand of post-modernism I spoke of. There it
75
Literature and Aesthetics
was only an 'effect' of the operation of wholly impersonal forces, and
as thus a passive consequence-an 'epiphenomenon', an ideological
effect, a mere piece of (for instance) the Marxian superstructure-it is
precluded from making any real difference. On the picture implicit in
what Kant says, individuality involves a perpetual redefining and re-
shaping of ourselves in the activity of such thinking. What Kant calls
'thinking aesthetic ideas', and I have spoken of more generally as
finding an ever deepenable sense in our experience, is an activity of
individual self-realisation. The Kantian picture, along with Bloom's,
actually sustains a sense of our individual human dignity and value
which is quite absent from the other picture, as it also sustains a
sense of this individuality as something we can never fully know, or
be wholly in possession of, but have continually to rediscover and
explore. It is continually 'at issue', and continually in resolution, in
our engagement in the kind of exploratory thinking which is ever
demanded of us if we are to 'make sense' of our experience, and which
'reading in the Canon' demands of us. And once again, the sense Kant
and Bloom enable us to make of the idea of individuality relies on
nothing which has to be regarded as a relic of specifically religious
convictions. The realising of such individuality depends upon one's
finding oneself in, and trusting,6 what Eliot calls the 'dialect of the
tribe'. Without that communal background, one can be, as an individual,
nothing. Yet without the creative 'agon' with the dialect of the tribe
which Bloom speaks of-and himself manifests in his own critical
response throughout his book-one will also remain less than an
individual. I do not mean-neither does Bloom-that everyone has
to be a reader of high literature. One is already involved in that
individualising 'agon' just in being a member of the tribe, thereby
participating in a living language by having to speak it as no-one
else ever quite has or will. In that sense individuality demands of
everyone that he or she be a poet. But in another sense there is also a
need for particular people of the kind we call poets and novelists and
dramatists to purify-we might also say deepen or intensify-the
dialect of the tribe.
Notes
1 The Western Canon: the Books and School a/the Ages, New York, 1994.
2 Nor do I myself think that Bloom really thinks it is so tied. His rhetoric
here has, it seems to me, temporarily blurred his own deeper insight.
3 The Demidenko Debate, Sydney, 1996.
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4 Here I am indebted to Raimond Gaita, 'Remorse and the Depiction of
Evil', Quadrant (May 1996): 33-36.
5 Among now classic texts of postmodemism which I think belong to the
first strand I should include Barbara Herrnstein Smith. Contingencies of
Value: Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory. Cambridge. Mass.•
1988; Frederic Jameson, The Political Unconscious, Paul de Man,
Allegories of Reading. New Haven, 1979; 1. Hillis Miller. The Ethics of
Reading, New York. 1987. and even Richard Rorty in The Consequences
ofPragmatism and Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. But the analytical
distinction between what I call two strands of postmodernism is cleaner
than the facts of the matter, and in all of the writers mentioned one can
find. in different ways and degrees, some suggestions of the second strand
of thought. Foucault is one writer. I think. whose work oscillates from one
strand to the other. (There is more of the second strand in the later work
than in the earlier work. but the contrast is not just between earlier and
later Foucault.) While, as I go on to suggest above, Kant's Critique of
Judgment shows that second strand, its most sustained philosophical
expression is the work of the later Wittgenstein.
6 Trusting here does not have to be something naive or thoughtless or even
uncritical. any more than trust between people need be so.
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